世界银行-中央银行独立性与主权借贷（英）

Policy Research Working Paper11179Central Bank Independence and Sovereign BorrowingAngelos AthanasopoulosNicolò FraccaroliAndreas KernDavide RomelliFinance, Competitiveness and Investment Global Department July 2025 Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedProduced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper 11179This paper studies the impact of central bank independence on sovereign borrowing, using an index that captures institu-tional constraints on central bank lending to the government across 155 countries from 1972 to 2023. The findings show that tighter lending to the executive significantly reduces sovereign interest rates and raises the debt-to-gross domestic product ratio in developing countries. These effects reflect the executive’s improved ability to borrow at lower costs under greater central bank independence. The results are robust to multiple tests, but there are no significant effects in advanced economies. From a policy perspective, the results highlight the key role of independent central banks as catalysts for reducing governments’ borrowing costs and enhancing the government’s borrowing capacity.This paper is a product of the Finance, Competitiveness and Investment Global Department. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at nfraccaroli@worldbank.org. Central Bank Independence and Sovereign Borrowing∗†Angelos AthanasopoulosCentral Bank of IrelandNicol`o FraccaroliWorld Bank & Brown UniversityAndreas KernGeorgetown UniversityDavide RomelliTrinity College DublinKeywords: central bank independence, government debt, interest rate, sovereign lending, central bank governance.JEL classification: E58, G28, N20.∗The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors.They do not necessarily represent the views of the Central Bank of Ireland, the International Bank forReconstruction and Development/World Bank, and its affiliated organisations, or those of the ExecutiveDirectors of