世界银行-企业官僚的财务溢价与实际成本（英）

Policy Research Working Paper10929The Financial Premium and Real Cost of Bureaucrats in BusinessesAna P. CusolitoRoberto N. Fattal-JaefFausto Patiño PeñaAkshat V. SinghEurope and Central Asia RegionDevelopment Research Group &Prosperity Practice GroupSeptember 2024 Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedProduced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper 10929This paper characterizes finance allocation distortions in capital markets across state-owned and private-owned enterprises. It does so by implementing Whited and Zhao’s (2021) methodology to infer idiosyncratic financial distor-tions on a novel firm-level database containing information on the ownership structure of firms operating in 24 Euro-pean countries during 2010–16. The analysis finds that firms with public authorities as direct shareholders (state-owned enterprises) have subsidized access to debt and equity, compared to their private counterparts. The paper then quantifies the macroeconomic effects of removing state-owned firms and reallocating their financial resources toward the private sector. The findings show that although state-owned enterprises are on average subsidized relative to private firms, removal of state-owned enterprises from the market may lead to aggregate productivity losses of up to 40 percent due to their superior technical efficiency in some sectors. Targeted reforms that only shut down poorly performing state-owned enterprises lead to aggregate total factor productivity gains in every country, reaching up to 15 percent. Reforms that in addition remove distortions before reallocating the released resources toward more productive firms increase productivity up to 83.7 percent.This paper is a product of the Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region, Development Research Group, and Prosperity Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at acusolito@worldbank.org, rfattaljaef@worldbank.org, fpatinopena@worldbank.org, and akshat.singh@econo