全球武器贸易中的新兴供应商（英文）

SUMMARYw Even though the volumes of arms exported by emerging suppliers are lower than those of the established exporters, they can nonetheless have a direct impact on international and regional security. The diversification in global arms transfers caused by the emergence of new suppliers therefore deserves scrutiny.Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are examples of emerging suppliers. Despite a continuous reliance on foreign technologies, they have managed to establish themselves in several niche categories of armaments or, in the case of South Korea, to widen the types of arms that they export. Exports of these emerging suppliers tend to go primarily to Africa, Asia and the Middle East, where most active armed conflicts are located, and also to Latin America. However, the drivers of the four countries’ arms exports differ: some have supplied with the intent to gain political influence, while others have primarily focused on the economic benefits. EMERGING SUPPLIERS IN THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADElucie béraud-sudreau, diego lopes da silva, alexandra kuimova and pieter d. wezemanNo. 2020/13 December 2020SIPRI Insights on Peace and SecurityI. IntroductionThe diversification of arms suppliers since the mid-2000s has brought changes to international security that are yet to be fully appreciated. Arms exports by emerging new suppliers—like those of established suppliers—may have a disruptive effect on peace, security and violent conflict. While the volume of major weapons exported by these emerging suppliers is lower than for established suppliers, their potential effects on the onset or dur ation of armed conflict can be just as significant. Although arms transfers are often justified as part of security policies that aim to maintain military balances or as support for counter terrorism, they are also associated with multiple risks for peace and security. This is recognized by multilateral agreements on regulation of the arms trade, such as the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).1 Efforts to regulate arms trans fers stem from the fact that these weapons can be used to perpetrate crimes against humanity, in attacks that target civilians, or in other violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.2 Other risks include the use of arms for internal repression and the potential for the equipment transferred to provoke or prolong armed conflicts or to aggra vate existing tensions or conflicts in the recipient state. Arms could also be used aggressively against another country or to assert a territorial claim by force.3 The diversification of arms suppliers exacerbates these risks and further complicates arms control regulation and compliance. An increase in supply can facilitate access to weapons at lower costs, hampering efforts to regu-late the arms trade. Moreover, the diversification of suppliers in any global market means that competition becomes more intense. In such a buyer’s market, arms suppliers may be