国际清算银行-银行监管的约束效应:来自SupTech的证据(英)
BIS Working Papers No 1256 The disciplining effect of bank supervision: evidence from SupTech by Hans Degryse, Cédric Huylebroek and Bernardus Van Doornik Monetary and Economic Department April 2025 JEL classification: G21, G28 Keywords: bank supervision, SupTech, bank risk-taking, bank lending, real effects BIS Working Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The papers are on subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). © Bank for International Settlements 2025. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISSN 1020-0959 (print) ISSN 1682-7678 (online) The Disciplining Effect of Bank Supervision:Evidence from SupTechHans Degryse∗Cédric Huylebroek†Bernardus Van Doornik‡March 18, 2025AbstractRegulators increasingly rely on supervisory technologies (SupTech) to enhancebank supervision, but their potential role in disciplining bank behavior remainsunclear. We address this knowledge gap using unique data from the SupTechapplication of the Central Bank of Brazil. We show that, after a SupTech event,banks reveal inconsistencies in their risk reporting and tighten credit to lesscreditworthy firms, effectively reducing risk-taking. This credit tightening in turnhas small spillovers on less creditworthy firms borrowing from affected banks.Our results can be explained by a moral suasion channel, offering novel insightsinto the role of SupTech in bank supervision.JEL Classification: G21, G28Keywords: Bank supervision, SupTech, Bank risk-taking, Bank lending, Realeffects∗KU Leuven and CEPR. E-mail: hans.degryse@kuleuven.be†KU Leuven and FWO. E-mail: cedric.huylebroek@kuleuven.be‡Banco Central do Brasil. E-mail: bernardus.doornik@bcb.gov.brNote: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Centraldo Brasil or the Bank for International Settlements. We are grateful to an anonymous referee from the BCB Working PaperSeries, Ertunc Aydogdu (discussant), Ricardo Correa, Olivier De Jonghe (discussant), Sebastian Doerr, Jon Frost, ZuzanaFungáčová, Rainer Haselmann (discussant), David-Jan Jansen (discussant), Georgi Kocharkov, Thomas Krause (discussant),Mike Mariathasan, Caterina Mendicino (discussant), Aksel Mjøs, Oana Peia (discussant) Matthew Plosser (discussant), AndreaPolo (discussant), Rafael Repullo, Maximilian Rohrer, Maria Rocamora (discussant), Philipp Schnabl, Elizaveta Sizova, PhilipStrahan (discussant), Javier Suarez, Alex Ufier (discussant), Iman van Lelyveld (discussant), Sergio Vicente (discussant), WolfWagner, Teng Wang (discussant) as well as conference and seminar participa
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