世界银行-重新评估单边排放定价的收入（英）

Policy Research Working Paper10922Rebating Revenues from Unilateral Emissions PricingChristoph BöhringerCarolyn FischerNicholas RiversDevelopment Economics Development Research GroupSeptember 2024 Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedProduced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper 10922This paper evaluates alternative options for rebating rev-enues from a unilateral emissions price, focusing on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. A theoret-ical model is developed to demonstrate that conditional rebating policies—which would be distortionary in a first-best world—may be welfare-improving. For example, this could occur in a context where emissions leakage and terms-of-trade changes are associated with the introduction of an emissions price, or when political constraints prevent the emissions price from fully reflecting the social cost of the emissions. A numerical simulation model is used to quantify the differences in welfare, leakage, terms of trade, output, and emissions across carbon prices with alternative rebating options for these leakage-prone industries. The different situations of the European Union and the United States are used as examples. The findings indicate that from a domestic perspective, rebating emissions revenues pro-portionately to firm output is typically superior to other rebating options when the emissions price is set close to the social cost of emissions. Rebating emission revenues to reward reductions in emissions intensity is typically superior when emissions are significantly under-priced. A country that is more emissions-intensive and less exposed to leak-age may prefer to rebate in proportion to total abatement when the emissions price is sufficiently low. The quantita-tive results indicate that there are significant welfare losses for incorrect choices of the rebating option.This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contact