IMF-在权力下放下预防财政危机：政府间政策和机构（英）

Preventing Fiscal Crises under Decentralization Intergovernmental Policies and Institutions Ryota Nakatani WP/25/87 IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. 2025 MAY * The author would like to thank Katherine Baer, Nikolay Gueorguiev, Jiro Honda, Teresa Ter-Minassian, Bryn Welham, AmandaSayegh, Alberto Tumino, Charles Vellutini, Carlos Goncalves, Rasmi Das, and other participants in the two seminars at the FiscalAffairs Department of the International Monetary Fund for their comments.© 2025 International Monetary Fund WP/25/87 IMF Working Paper Fiscal Affairs Department Preventing Fiscal Crises under Decentralization: Intergovernmental Policies and Institutions Prepared by Ryota Nakatani* Authorized for distribution by Nikolay Gueorguiev May 2025 IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT: What instruments can governments deploy to prevent fiscal crises in decentralized fiscal systems? This analysis reveals that good public sector institutions, controls by the central government over local fiscal balances and borrowing, and intergovernmental transfers could be effective instruments for reducing the probability of a crisis. Strengthening good institutions mitigates the unwanted effects of devolution on fiscal unsustainability by inhibiting allocative inefficiencies caused by the moral hazard of governments. Expenditure decentralization to local governments increases the probability of a crisis only when local governments run large budget deficits, indicating that controls by the center over the local budget balance or borrowing ability may help to avoid overspending and the resulting excessive indebtedness. Subnational fiscal rules and administrative constraints also reduce the probability of a crisis. Intergovernmental transfers are associated with a lower probability of a fiscal crisis because they can play a role in interregional risk sharing among subnational governments. RECOMMENDED CITATION: Nakatani, Ryota. 2025. “Preventing Fiscal Crises under Decentralization: Intergovernmental Policies and Institutions” IMF Working Paper 25/87. JEL Classification Numbers: H77; H72; H74; H71; D73 Keywords: Fiscal Crisis; Decentralization; Intergovernmental Transfers; Subnational Fiscal Rules; Administrative Constraints; Corruption Author’s E-Mail Address: rnakatani@IMF.org WORKING PAPERS Preventing Fiscal Crises under Decentralization Intergovernmental Policies and Institutions Prepared by Ryota Nakatani IMF WORKING PAPERS Preventing Fiscal Crises under