美联储-抵押贷款设计、还款计划和家庭借款（英）

Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesFederal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online)Mortgage Design, Repayment Schedules, and HouseholdBorrowingClaes B¨ackman, Patrick Moran, Peter van Santen2024-077Please cite this paper as:B¨ackman, Claes, Patrick Moran, and Peter van Santen (2024).“Mortgage Design,Repayment Schedules, and Household Borrowing,” Finance and Economics DiscussionSeries 2024-077.Washington:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.077.NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.Mortgage Design, Repayment Schedules, and Household Borrowing∗Claes B¨ackman†Patrick Moran‡Peter van Santen§June 4, 2024AbstractHow does the design of debt repayment schedules affect household borrowing? To answerthis question, we exploit a Swedish policy reform that eliminated interest-only mortgages forloan-to-value ratios above 50%. We document substantial bunching at the threshold, leadingto 5% lower borrowing. Wealthy borrowers drive the results, challenging credit constraints asthe primary explanation. We develop a model to evaluate the mechanisms driving householdbehavior and find that much of the effect comes from households experiencing ongoing flowdisutility to amortization payments. Our results indicate that mortgage contracts with lowinitial payments substantially increase household borrowing and lifetime interest costs.JEL Classification: G51, G21, E21, E6Keywords: Mortgage design; Amortization payments; Macroprudential policy; Bunching∗We thank Rob Alessie, Johan Almenberg, Olga Balakina, Vimal Balasubramaniam, Eirik Brandsaas, TahaChoukhmane, Tobin Hanspal, Stephanie Johnson (discussant), Ragnar Juelsrud, Karin Kinnerud, Kaveh Majlesi,Clemens Sialm (discussant), Jakob Sogaard, Lars E.O. Svensson, Nikodem Szumilo and seminar participants atthe ECB, Sveriges Riksbank, University of Groningen, Lund University, Nordic Junior Macro Seminar, EFA,Central Bank of Ireland Workshop on Borrower Finances, the NFN Young Scholars Finance Webinar series,IAAE, EEA-ESEM, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Goethe University,the IMF, and ASSA 2024 for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge research support from the LeibnizInstitute for Financial Research SAFE. Claes B¨ackman would like to thank Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedeliusstiftelse for generous financial support. The empirical analysis in this paper was done when van Santen workedat the Financial Stability Department of Sveriges Riks