美联储-结算速度与金融稳定（英）

Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesFederal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online)Settlement Speed and Financial StabilityAgostino Capponi, Jin-Wook Chang2025-101Please cite this paper as:Capponi, Agostino, and Jin-Wook Chang (2025). “Settlement Speed and Financial Stabil-ity,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-101. Washington: Board of Governorsof the Federal Reserve System, https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2025.101.NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.Settlement Speed and Financial Stability ∗Agostino Capponi†Jin-Wook Chang‡November 10, 2025AbstractThis paper investigates how settlement speed affects financial stability in paymentnetworks, taking into account netting benefits, liquidity costs, and counterparty risks.Our analysis reveals that faster settlements have ambiguous effects on systemic risk andsocial welfare. The optimal settlement speed is determined by the network structureand the trade-off between netting efficiency and liquidity costs on one hand, and theprobability of counterparty defaults on the other.Notably, we identify conditions,particularly under liquidity stress, where faster settlement can paradoxically increasesystemic risk by amplifying crisis severity, even while reducing crisis probability. Ourresults have important policy implications, arguing against a one-size-fits-all approachto settlement speed design.Keywords: settlement, payment systems, financial network, financial stability, systemicriskJEL Classification Numbers: D49, D53, G01, G21, G33∗We thank Francesca Carapella, Adam Copeland, Darrell Duffie, Michael Gordy, David Rappoport, andAlexandros Vardoulakis for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at theFederal Reserve Board. We thank Siddhartha Lewis-Hayre for excellent research assistance. This articlerepresents the view of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the FederalReserve System or its members.†Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research and Columbia Business School, ColumbiaUniversity, New York, NY, USA. Email: ac3827@columbia.edu.‡Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Email: jin-wook.chang@frb.gov.11.IntroductionThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently implemented the conversionof the U.S. securities market to a T+1 (one business day after the trade date) settlementcycle, starting May 28, 2024. Following the SEC’s implementation of the new settlementspeed, there has not been a noti