IMF-主权债务危机中的贸易动态（英）

Trade Dynamics in Sovereign Debt Crises Tamon Asonuma, Marcos Chamon, Yasumasa Morito, Akira Sasahara WP/25/240 IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. 2025 NOV * This is a substantially revised version of IMF WP 16/222 “Trade Costs of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Does a Market-FriendlyApproach Improve the Outcome?” The authors thank JaeBin Ahn, Eugenia Andreasen, Felipe Benguria, Rudolf Berms, XavierDebrun, Gabriel Devoto, Aitor Erce, Daisuke Fujii, Gino Gancia, Atish Rex Ghosh, Grey Gordon, Graciela Kaminsky, David Kohn,Silvia Marchesi, Ugo Panizza, Fernando Parro, Toan Phan, Romain Ranciere, Michele Ruta, Guido Sandleris, Tiago Tavares, AlanM. Taylor, Christoph Trebesch, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jing Zhang, and Robert Zymek as well as seminar participants at Banco deEspana, Bank of Greece, Bank of Japan, China Meeting of the Econometric Society, D-DebtCon Webinar (UCTD), Federal ReserveBank of Richmond, 1st Winter Workshop in Recent Advances in Macroeconomics (Osaka Univ.-Univ. of Surrey), IMF, JapanSociety of International Economics, JHU-SAIS, Kyoto Univ., Osaka Univ., 2nd International Macro/Finance and Sovereign DebtWorkshop in East Asia (Sogang Univ.), Sophia Univ., Waseda University, Workshop on Sovereign Debt (Universit`a degli Studi diMilano Bicocca) for comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Eiman Asfar, Naana Hennewaah Asnmah and ClaudiaMaria Isern, for editorial assistance.© 2025 International Monetary Fund WP/25/240IMF Working Paper Strategy and Policy Review Department Trade Dynamics in Sovereign Debt Crises Prepared by Tamon Asonuma, Marcos Chamon, Yasumasa Morito, Akira Sasahara* Authorized for distribution by Allison Holland October 2025 IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT: Sovereign debt restructurings can have large impacts on trade, with a significant compression of imports and a more ambiguous effect on exports. We show that the magnitude of that impact depends on whether restructurings preempt a default or take place after payments have been missed, with the latter associated with longer and deeper crises. Import compression is significantly higher following post-default restructurings, which also tend to be associated with higher exports relative to preemptive restructurings. This is consistent with the need for a larger external adjustment following a default. We also show how the effect varies across types of goods, and a larger impact when initial aggregate domestic demand in the debtor’s economy