非洲经济研究中心-南非宏观审慎政策的治理（英）

The Governance of Macroprudential Policy in South Africa JANINE ARON CSAE, Department of Economics and INET, University of Oxford, UK GREG FARRELL Macro-Financial Analysis Research Group, School of Economics and Finance, University of the Witwatersrand. and JOHN MUELLBAUER INET and Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK October 2025 Abstract South Africa’s experience developing a macroprudential role for its central bank could yield lessons for emerging market central banks. An explicit mandate to maintain and enhance financial stability accompanied a re-defined prudential and conduct regulatory (‘Twin Peaks’) framework in the Financial Sector Regulation Act of 2017. Using a macroprudential lens and international comparative analysis, this paper goes further than previous analyses (largely by legal scholars) and reveals weaknesses in the governance design for macroprudential policy. We suggest changes in the design of institutions, processes, transparency and accountability, to improve and future-proof SA macroprudential policymaking. These include: formalising the role of the central bank’s Financial Stability Committee - the de facto executive body for policy but not mentioned in the Act - preferably as a smaller statutory committee with external members and improved reportage; strengthening macroprudential policy in ‘ordinary’ times’ by adopting ‘comply or explain’ recommendations to reduce the Act’s crisis focus and better manage credit cycles; improved data collection to extend the macroprudential instrument toolbox for Borrower Based Measures and create early warning indicators for vulnerable households; and, for the Financial Stability Review, to address gaps in tracking and reporting risk indicators, and policy decisions, to better meet its new role as vehicle for transparency and accountability under the Act. We also consider political economic trade-offs between protecting the SA banking system and wider social and economic goals. Key words: macroprudential governance, central banking institutions, central bank transparency, financial regulation, credit cycles, financial crisis, systemic risk, financial stability, loan-to-value, debt-to-income. JEL classification: E58, G01, G18, G21, G23, G28. ii Acknowledgements Janine Aron and John Muellbauer have twice previously been invited Research Fellows in the Financial Stability Department of the South African Reserve Bank, investigating the core model, models of the housing market, non-performing loans, macroprudential issues and risk indicators linked with the housing market, and communication. They also co-authored an invited assessment of the Financial Stability Review in 2018. Greg Farrell was a co-author on some of this work and was formerly a macroprudential economist in the Financial Stability Department of the South African Reserve Bank. In writing the above assessment, governance issues arose which we three were delighted to develop in this paper for WIDE