世界银行-财富、婚姻与性别选择（英）

Policy Research Working Paper11147Wealth, Marriage, and Sex SelectionGirija BorkerJan EeckhoutNancy LukeShantidani MinzKaivan Munshi Soumya Swaminathan Development Economics Development Impact GroupJune 2025 A verified reproducibility package for this paper is available at http://reproducibility.worldbank.org, click here for direct access. Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedProduced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper 11147Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selec-tion in India: son preference in which parents desire a male heir and daughter aversion in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing micro-foundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simu-lations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.This paper is a product of the Development Impact Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at gborker@worldbank.org. A verified reproducibility package for this paper is available at http://reproducibility.worldbank.org, click here for direct access. POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPERSTRANSPARENTANALYSISWealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection∗Girija Borker†Jan Eeckhout‡Nancy Luke§Shantidani Minz¶Kaivan Munshi‖Soumya Swaminathan∗∗Keywords. Family Economics. Social Norms. Marriage Market. Sex Selection. Caste. Assortative Matching. Wealth Distribution. Inequality. Control Function.JEL. J12. J16. D31. I3.∗Akhil Lohia, Johannes Maywald and Angela Marcela Rojas Franco provided exceptional research assistance and SwapnilSingh graciously helped us with the cross validation. Research support from the National Institut