乌克兰的入盟申请给欧盟带来了压力（英）

NO. 21 MARCH 2022 Introduction Ukraine’s Membership Bid Puts Pressure on the European Union A Security Policy Flanking, Not a Revision of EU Enlargement Policy, Is Advisable Barbara Lippert As Russian tanks and artillery advanced on Kharkiv and Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an application to join the European Union. He called for a special admission procedure to secure swift accession for Ukraine, yet Ukraine did not first aspire to EU membership under missile fire. Much like Moldova and Georgia, it sees its current status of association with the EU as a precursor to accession. The 28 Feb-ruary application was a call for help from the dreadful war. Initial responses from the European Commission and the European Parliament indicated much political sym-pathy for Ukraine’s urgent call, but the EU leaders do not hold forth the prospect of swift accession. This restraint results from the experience that membership negotia-tions are generally challenging and protracted and that there are no short cuts to the goal. There are, indeed, EU interests that run counter to an explicit memership per-spective. The EU should in any case add a security component flanking its policy of integration and cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries. In response to Ukraine’s membership application Commission President Ursula von der Leyen replied promptly to President Zelensky that “We want them [Ukraine] in”. That went beyond the EU’s internal con-sensus formula according to which the EU acknowledges Ukraine’s aspirations and its choice for Europe but is not itself politically committed to that goal. While the Commis-sion in Brussels is the ever benevolent manager of the enlargement process, it is the EU’s member states that determine the course and pace of progress. Since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russia’s recognition of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the the EU’s initiation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009, the Baltic states, Poland and Sweden have more and more openly favoured an explicit acces-sion offer to the so-called Associated Trio (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). But neither France nor Germany have followed suit. Even after the Euromaidan in 2013/14 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 they both insisted that in the medium term suc-cessful implementation of the association agreements, including the deep and com-prehensive free trade area (DCFTA), and not EU membership, headed the agenda. SWP Comment 21 March 2022 2 The EU sees Putin’s war against Ukraine as a turning point, however. What does this mean for its policy towards Ukraine? What possibilities for action does the EU have and what are the implications for its enlarge-ment policy? The options outlined as follows only stand a chance of realization if, after the end of the war, the EU still finds in Kyiv a legitimate government that has preserved its sovereignty against Moscow. If Russia appoints a proxy regi