世界银行-算法与官僚：来自塞内加尔税务审计选择的证据（英）

Policy Research Working Paper11205Algorithms and BureaucratsEvidence from Tax Audit Selection in SenegalPierre Jean BachasAnne BrockmeyerAlipio FerreiraBassirou SarrDevelopment Economics Development Research GroupSeptember 2025 Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedProduced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper 11205Can algorithms enhance bureaucrats’ work in developing countries? In data-poor environments, bureaucrats often exercise discretion over key decisions, such as audit selec-tion. Exploiting newly digitized micro-data, this study conducted an at-scale field experiment whereby half of Sen-egal’s annual audit program was selected by tax inspectors and the other half by a transparent risk-scoring algorithm. The algorithm-selected audits were 18 percentage points less likely to be conducted, detected 89% less evasion, were less cost-effective, and did not reduce corruption. Moreover, even a machine-learning algorithm would only have mod-erately raised detected evasion. These results are consistent with bureaucrats’ expertise, the task complexity, and inher-ent data limitations.This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at pbachas@worldbank.org and abrockmeyer@worldbank.org. Algorithms and Bureaucrats:Evidence from Tax Audit Selection in SenegalPierre Bachas, Anne Brockmeyer, Alipio Ferreira, Bassirou Sarr*JEL codes: O17, H83, H26, D73Keywords: Audits, Algorithms, Discretion, Risk-score, Tax Administration, Tax Evasion*Pierre Bachas: World Bank Research, pbachas@worldbank.org; Anne Brockmeyer: World Bank, IFS, UCL and CEPR,abrockmeyer@worldbank.org; Alipio Ferreira: Southern Methodist University, alipioferreira@smu.edu; Bassirou Sarr:Senegal Ministry of Finance. We thank Denis Cogneau, Laurent Corthay, L´eo Czajka, Lucie Gadenne, Stephen Hansen,Janet Jiang, Nicola Limodio, Jan Loeprick, Markus Kitzmuller, Justine Knebelmann, Imran Rasul, Dan Rogger, Ed