英国国家经济和社会研究所-英国的人力资本与生产力停滞（英）

National Institute UK Economic Outlook – Summer 2025 National Institute of Economic and Social Research 1Box C: Human Capital and Stagnating Productivity in the United Kingdom By Aditya Goenka and Lin Liu Over the past two decades, the United Kingdom has persistently underperformed on productivity, with GDP per hour worked growing by just 0.6 per cent per annum between 2007 and 2019 — below the OECD average of 1.2 per cent. This ‘productivity puzzle’ has profound implications for living standards, fiscal sustainability, and global competitiveness. Human capital encompassing the knowledge, skills, and health of the workforce, is widely recognized as a key driver of productivity: a healthier, better-educated workforce generates greater innovation, adapts more rapidly to technological change, and sustains higher output per worker. The relative decline in UK human capital — specifically in higher-education enrolment and health outcomes — accounts for a substantial share of its productivity shortfall. The role of education and health in productivity is well documented in the literature (Lucas, 1988). It contributes both to the quantity and quality of labour input. A more educated workforce tends to be more adaptable, innovative, and productive (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Simultaneously, better health enhances both labour force participation and work efficiency. Studies in macroeconomics and labour economics suggest that both factors contribute directly and indirectly to total factor productivity (TFP), making them indispensable components of long-term growth (Barro, 2001; Jones (2014). The education and health deficits may be contributing to the United Kingdom’s productivity lag compared to OECD peers. Trends in Productivity From 2000 to 2007, UK labour productivity tracked the OECD mean; post-2008, UK growth slowed dramatically (0.3 per cent per annum vs. the OECD average of 1.5 per cent as shown in figure C1). Growth accounting attributes 40 per cent of the UK productivity slowdown since 2008 to TFP weakness, 25 per cent to capital, and 35 per cent to a flatlining in labour-quality growth. The gap in productivity levels has widened steadily, positioning the UK amongst the weaker performers in the G7 and OECD. This divergence underscores the need to look beyond traditional inputs like capital investment and focus more closely on labour quality. The United Kingdom’s underperformance is especially stark when benchmarked against high-performing OECD countries such as Germany, Sweden, and Japan, which have maintained more consistent investment in both education and public health. National Institute UK Economic Outlook – Summer 20252 National Institute of Economic and Social ResearchFigure C1 GVA per hour worked901001101201301402000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024Index: 2000=100AustraliaCanadaFranceGermanyItalyJapanKoreaSwedenUnited KingdomSource: OECD.Education and Productivity The UK share of 18–21-year-olds in higher education rose from