未来能源研究所-更好的激励措施促进高效传输：价格上限监管的潜在贡献（英）

Better Incentives for Efficient Transmission: The Potential Contribution of Price Cap RegulationABetter Incentives for Efficient Transmission: The Potential Contribution of Price Cap RegulationTimothy J. BrennanReport 25-04 February 2025Resources for the FutureiAbout the AuthorTimothy J. Brennan is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future (RFF) and professor emeritus at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County’s School of Public Policy. Brennan has been a staff economist with the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and a non-resident adviser to the Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics. Brennan has served as the senior economist for industrial organization and regulation with the White House Council of Economic Advisers and chief economist at the Federal Communications Commission. He has also held the T.D. MacDonald Chair in Industrial Economics at the Canadian Competition Bureau.Acknowledgements This work was supported by RFF’s Electric Power Program; opinions and errors remain my sole responsibility.About RFFResources for the Future (RFF) is an independent, nonprofit research institution in Washington, DC. Its mission is to improve environmental, energy, and natural resource decisions through impartial economic research and policy engagement. RFF is committed to being the most widely trusted source of research insights and policy solutions leading to a healthy environment and a thriving economy. The views expressed here are those of the individual authors and may differ from those of other RFF experts, its officers, or its directors.Sharing Our WorkOur work is available for sharing and adaptation under an Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) license. You can copy and redistribute our material in any medium or format; you must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made, and you may not apply additional restrictions. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. You may not use the material for commercial purposes. If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.Resources for the FutureiiAbstractA low-cost method for increasing transmission capacity is to use grid-enhancing technologies (GETs). Setting transmission rates on the basis of cost may lead transmission providers to choose to install lines at greater cost than GETs. Price cap regulation (PCR) adjusts rates over time on the basis of inflation and expected (but not actual) cost reductions, thus giving the regulated firm an incentive to reduce costs, such as by adopting GETs. Allowed rates are likely to eventually diverge from costs enough to warrant regulatory recalibration, reducing the advantages of PCR. PCR is also not designed to incentivize quality, such as resilience.