美联储-货币政策、不确定性与沟通（英）

Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesFederal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online)Monetary Policy, Uncertainty, and CommunicationsVaishali Garga, Edward Herbst, Alisdair McKay, Giovanni Nicol`o, MatthiasPaustian2025-074Please cite this paper as:Garga, Vaishali, Edward Herbst, Alisdair McKay, Giovanni Nicol`o, and Matthias Paustian(2025).“Monetary Policy, Uncertainty, and Communications,” Finance and EconomicsDiscussion Series 2025-074. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2025.074.NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. Page 1 of 22 Monetary Policy, Uncertainty, and Communications Vaishali Garga, Edward Herbst, Alisdair McKay, Giovanni Nicolò, Matthias Paustian1 The analysis in this paper was presented to the Federal Open Market Committee as background for its discussion of the Federal Reserve’s 2025 review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communications. Abstract: We review the design and communication of monetary policy strategies that take into account risks and uncertainty. A key element in a robust monetary strategy is the concept of risk management, which is the weighing of key risks when setting policy. When risks to the outlook are balanced, the baseline outlook may be sufficient to guide policy decisions. However, risk-management considerations become important when risks are asymmetric. We discuss how robust simple interest rate rules and optimal control policy can incorporate risk-management considerations into the design of a monetary policy strategy. Alternative scenarios can illustrate salient risks and how monetary policy might respond if those risks were to materialize. However, using alternative scenarios in policy deliberations and communications requires important implementation choices. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E52, E58. Keywords: Uncertainty, risk management, robust monetary policy strategies, scenario analysis, monetary policy communication. Note: Authors’ affiliations are Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Herbst, Nicolò, and Paustian), Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Garga), and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (McKay), respectively. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of anyone else affiliated with the Federal Reserve System. The authors benefited from the comments and suggestions of Jonas Fisher, Christopher Gust, Benjamin Johannsen, Michael Kiley, Sylvain Led