纽约联储-赎回费能防止资金挤兑吗？（英）

Can Redemption Fees Prevent Runs on Funds? Xuesong Huang | Todd Keister NO. 1160 AUGUST 2025 Can Redemption Fees Prevent Runs on Funds? Xuesong Huang and Todd Keister Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 1160 August 2025 https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1160 Abstract We ask whether imposing fees on redeeming investors can prevent runs on money market mutual funds (MMFs) and related intermediation arrangements. We first show that imposing a fee only in extraordinary times often leaves the fund susceptible to a preemptive run where investors rush to redeem before the fee applies. We then show how a policy that imposes a fee when current redemption demand is above a threshold, even in normal times, can make the fund run proof. We characterize the best policy of this type, which is immune to a run of any size. We show that the reform adopted in the U.S. in 2023 leaves funds vulnerable to runs in some market conditions and imposes an inefficiently large fee in others. JEL classification: G28, G23, D82 Key words: financial stability policy, preemptive runs, shadow banking _________________ Keister: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Rutgers University (email: todd.keister@ny.frb.org). Huang: Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University (email: xuesong.huangll@gmail.com). The authors thank Huberto Ennis, Kinda Hachem, Chao He, Cecilia Paratore, Bo Wang, David Skeie, Yizhou Xiao, Shengxing Zhang, Zhen Zhou, and participants at many conferences and seminars for helpful comments and suggestions. Ziyu Xing provided excellent research assistance. Part of this research was conducted when Keister was a short-term visitor at the CIRJE, University of Tokyo, whose hospitality and support are gratefully acknowledged. Huang gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation of China (Project No. 72303257). This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interested readers solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s). To view the authors’ disclosure statements, visit https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr1160.html. 1IntroductionThe failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 sparked a run on prime money marketmutual funds (MMFs) in the U.S, with over $400 billion withdrawn in a two-week period.Because these funds play an important role in short-term funding markets, the U.S. Treasuryand Federal Reserve responded with extraordinary liquidity facilities and guarantees forMMF investors.In 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced areform designed to prevent a repeat of this experience. The new rules allowed a fund to limitredemptions and impose a redemption fee when its liq