纽约联储-金融稳定理论符合现实（英）

The Theory of Financial Stability Meets Reality Nina Boyarchenko | Kinda Hachem | Anya Kleymenova NO. 1155 JUNE 2025 The Theory of Financial Stability Meets Reality Nina Boyarchenko, Kinda Hachem, and Anya Kleymenova Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 1155 June 2025 https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1155 Abstract A large literature at the intersection of economics and finance offers prescriptions for regulating banks to increase financial stability. This literature abstracts from the discretion that accounting standards give banks over financial reporting, creating a gap between the information assumed to be available to regulators in models of optimal regulation and the information available to regulators in reality. We bridge insights from the economics, finance, and accounting literatures to synthesize knowledge about the design and implementation of bank regulation and identify areas where more work is needed. We present a simple framework for organizing the relevant ideas, namely the externalities that motivate bank regulation, the rationales for allowing accounting discretion, and the use of discretion to circumvent regulation. Our takeaway from reviewing work in these areas is that academic studies of bank regulation and accounting discretion require a more unified approach to design optimal policy for the real world. JEL classification: D62, E44, G21, G28, M41 Key words: bank regulation, accounting discretion, regulatory arbitrage, financial stability, optimal policy _________________ Boyarchenko, Hachem: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (emails: nina.boyarchenko@ny.frb.org, kinda.hachem@ny.frb.org). Kleymenova: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (email: anya.kleymenova@frb.gov). The authors thank David Romer and four anonymous referees for many insightful comments. They also thank William Bassett, Christopher Finger, João Santos, Cindy Vojtech, and especially Jim Naughton for helpful conversations. This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interested readers solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s). To view the authors’ disclosure statements, visit https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr1155.html. 1. IntroductionBanking is a heavily regulated industry, yet it remains prone to large and costly disrup-tions. Over the past forty years, the U.S. has experienced two systemic banking crises: thesavings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s and the global financial crisis (GFC) that beganin 2007. It has also experienced more localized disruptions such as the failure of ContinentalIllinois in May 1984 and the regional banking distress sparked by