世界银行-主权风险下的扩张性财政整合（英）

Policy Research Working Paper11156Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation Under Sovereign RiskCarlos EsquivelAgustin SamanoDevelopment Economics Development Research GroupJune 2025 Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedProduced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper 11156This paper develops a sovereign default model with capital accumulation, long-term debt, and fiscal rules with two dis-tortions: debt dilution and private underinvestment. Fiscal rules generate a long-run economic expansion because they mitigate default risk caused by dilution, which increases capital accumulation. In the short run, however, the econ-omy goes through a costly transition where consumption and investment drop to finance debt reduction. These dynamic trade-offs are quantified, and the welfare gains of fiscal rules are computed using a calibration for Argentina. A debt limit of 44 percent of gross domestic product attains the maximal welfare gain of 0.5 percent. Implementation of the debt limit generates short-lived drops in consump-tion and investment of 5 and 7 percent, respectively, and a long-run gross domestic product expansion of 1.4 percent. The paper relaxes the assumption of commitment to the rule and discusses how the threat of exclusion from imple-menting future rules provides enough incentives to avoid deviations. Welfare gains more than double in this case.This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at asamanopenaloza@worldbank.org; and carlos.esquivel@rutgers.edu. Expansionary Fiscal ConsolidationUnder Sovereign Risk*Carlos Esquivel†Agustin Samano‡Keywords: Fiscal rules, Sovereign risk, Expansionary fiscal consolidation.JEL Codes: F34, F41*The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do notnecessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent.Fo