美联储-银行是否为抵押贷款发放中的洪水风险定价：来自新奥尔良自然实验的证据（英）

Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesFederal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online)Do Banks Price Flood Risk in Mortgage Origination: Evidencefrom a Natural Experiment in New OrleansDavid M. Arseneau and Gazi I. Kara2025-081Please cite this paper as:Arseneau, David M., and Gazi I. Kara (2025). “Do Banks Price Flood Risk in MortgageOrigination: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in New Orleans,” Finance and EconomicsDiscussion Series 2025-081. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2025.081.NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.Do Banks Price Flood Risk in Mortgage Originations?Evidence from a Natural Experiment in New Orleans∗David M. Arseneau and Gazi I. KaraFederal Reserve BoardSeptember 8, 2025AbstractThis paper uses a large-scale redrawing of flood zone maps for the City of New Orleansin 2016 to identify how banks respond to changes in perceived flood risk in residential mort-gage origination. Using geo-coding, we separate loan-level data on mortgage originations intotreatment versus control groups based on how individual properties were affected by the mapchanges. We find banks charged interest rates that were roughly 6 basis points higher for mort-gages on treated properties that were removed from the special floods zones as a result of themap changes. In addition, lower loan-to-value ratios for mortgages on these properties suggestthat banks also required higher downpayments. Both effects are temporary, lasting under twoyears. Further analysis using flood insurance claims data following a major flooding event in2017 suggests the temporary nature of these effects may reflect learning by banks about thetrue extent of flood risk and insurance take-up following the map changes.Keywords: FEMA Maps, Flood insurance, Mortgage lendingJEL Classifications: G21; Q54; R3∗The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the FederalReserve Board of Governors or anyone in the Federal Reserve System. We thank Audrey Selley, Marcus Dockerty, andChelsea Hunter for excellent research assistance and Antonis Kotidis, Manuel Adolino, Hyeyoon Jung, and BhavyaaSharma for helpful comments. We thank conference and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Board, WesleyanUniversity, Ko¸c University, Central Bank of the Republic of T¨urkiye, IFABS Conference in Oxford, Southern EconomicAssociation Annual Meeting in Fort Lauderdale, IEA World Congress in Medellin and EFMA