美联储-地缘政治风险与全球银行业（英）

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemInternational Finance Discussion PapersISSN 1073-2500 (Print)ISSN 2767-4509 (Online)Number 1418August 2025Geopolitical Risk and Global BankingFriederike Niepmann, Leslie Sheng ShenPlease cite this paper as:Niepmann, Friederike, and Leslie Sheng Shen (2025). “Geopolitical Risk and Global Bank-ing,” International Finance Discussion Papers 1418. Washington: Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System, https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2025.1418.NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers (IFDPs) are preliminary materials circulated to stimu-late discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors anddo not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. Referencesin publications to the International Finance Discussion Papers Series (other than acknowledgement) shouldbe cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. Recent IFDPs are availableon the Web at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/. This paper can be downloaded without charge from theSocial Science Research Network electronic library at www.ssrn.com.Geopolitical Risk and Global Banking∗Friederike Niepmann†Leslie Sheng Shen‡July 2025AbstractHow do banks respond to geopolitical risk, and is this response distinct from othermacroeconomic risks? Using U.S. supervisory data and new geopolitical risk indices, weshow that banks reduce cross-border lending to countries with elevated geopolitical riskbut continue lending to those markets through foreign affiliates—unlike their responseto other macro risks. Furthermore, banks reduce domestic lending when geopoliticalrisk rises abroad, especially when they operate foreign affiliates. A simple bankingmodel in which geopolitical shocks feature expropriation risk can explain these findings:Foreign funding through affiliates limits downside losses, making affiliate divestmentless attractive and amplifying domestic spillovers.Keywords: geopolitical risk, bank lending, credit risk, international spilloversJEL-Codes: F34, F36, G21∗We thank conference and seminar participants for helpful conversations and feedback, particularly Chris-tian Blickle, Nick Bloom, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, S¸ebnem Kalemli-¨Ozcan, Camelia Minoiu, Andrea Presbitero,Christopher Trebesch, and Andrei Zlate. We also thank Hannah Bensen, Isabel Culver, Caitlin Kawamura,Julian Perry, and David Schramm for fantastic research assistance and data support. The views in this paperare solely the responsibility of the authors and should not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting the viewsof the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, or any otherperson associated with the Federal Reserve System.†Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; email: friederike.niepmann@frb.gov.‡Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; email: lesliesheng.shen@bos.frb.org.1IntroductionGeopolitical risk has escalated in recent y