IMF-量化宽松的宏观经济和财政后果（英）

Macroeconomic and Fiscal Consequences of Quantitative Easing Tobias Adrian, Christopher Erceg, Marcin Kolasa, Jesper Linde, and Pawel Zabczyk WP/25/158IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. 2025 AUG INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ii © 2025 International Monetary Fund WP/25/158IMF Working Paper Monetary and Capital Markets Department Macroeconomic and Fiscal Consequences of Quantitative Easing Tobias Adrian, Christopher Erceg, Marcin Kolasa, Jesper Linde, and Pawel Zabczyk*1 Authorized for distribution by Julie Kozack August 2025 IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT: Quantitative easing (QE) has been criticized for helping fuel the post-COVID inflation boom and causing large central bank losses. In this paper, we argue that QE should be evaluated mainly on its ability to achieve core macro-objectives as well for its effects on the consolidated fiscal position of the government and central bank, although central bank losses can matter to the extent that they may weaken central bank credibility. Using a DSGE model with segmented asset markets, we show how QE can provide a sizeable boost to output and inflation in a deep liquidity trap and can reduce public debt substantially. This contrasts to the rise in public debt that occurs under fiscal expansion and makes QE an attractive tool in a high debt environment. There is more reason for caution in using QE in a “shallow" liquidity trap in which the notional interest rate is only slightly negative: QE runs more risk of causing the economy to overheat, especially if forward guidance has a strong element of commitment, and is more likely to generate sizeable central bank losses. Some refinements in strategy, including the use of escape clauses, can help mitigate overheating risks. JEL Classification Numbers: C54, E1, E3, E5, G12 Keywords: Monetary Policy; Effective Lower Bound; Quantitative Easing;Central Bank Balance Sheet; Government Debt; New KeynesianModel Author’s E-Mail Address: TAdrian@IMF.org, CErceg@IMF.org, MKolasa@IMF.org, JLinde@IMF.org, and PZabczyk@IMF.org 1* We are grateful for comments and suggestions by our discussants Sarah Zubairy and Thomas Mertens, participants at the IMF's 5th Advances in Monetary Economics conference (September 2024), at the NBER Summer Institute (July 2025), and from Helge Berger, Andrew Levin, and Marianne Nessén. This paper represents the view of the authors and not those of the IMF Staff, IMF Management, or IMF Executive Board. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Cons