国际清算银行-政府债券市场的中央清算：确保“安全资产”的安全？（英）

BIS Bulletin No 92 Central clearing in government bond markets: keeping the “safe asset” safe? Matteo Aquilina, Martin Scheicher and Andreas Schrimpf 19 September 2024 BIS Bulletins are written by staff members of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The papers are on subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. The authors are grateful to Inaki Aldasoro, Matthias Drehmann, Bryan Hardy, Wenqian Huang, David MacDonald, Hyun Song Shin, Takeshi Shirakami, Vladyslav Sushko and Kevin Tracol, for helpful comments and suggestions, to Alberto Americo for excellent research assistance, and to Nicola Faessler for administrative support. The editor of the BIS Bulletin series is Hyun Song Shin. This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). © Bank for International Settlements 2024. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISSN: 2708-0420 (online) ISBN: 978-92-9259-789-4 (online) BIS Bulletin 1 Matteo AquilinaMatteo.Aquilina@bis.orgmMartin ScheicherMartin.Scheicher@ecb.europa.euAndreas SchrimpfAndreas.Schrimpf@bis.org Central clearing in government bond markets: keeping the “safe asset” safe? Key takeaways • Government bond trading is typically over the counter, with dealers playing a key role as intermediaries. Pressure on their intermediation capacity is set to increase as government debt continues to grow. • Enhancing the volume of centrally cleared transactions could help mitigate risks to market functioning by freeing up the balance sheet of dealers and encouraging all-to-all trading. • The need for liquidity management will remain. Fixing the “plumbing” alone may have limited impact in a market-wide deleveraging episode with one-sided flows. Hence central clearing of government bonds and repos would not fully eliminate financial market risks but would change their nature. Government bond markets – traditionally viewed as safe havens, at least in many advanced economies – have become focal points of market stress.1 Liquid and well-functioning markets for government debt critically rest on the intermediation capacity of dealers, which often form part of large banking groups. This capacity has been pressured by both the trajectory of government debt, which has been on an upward trend since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), and the growth of leveraged strategies by investors that lead to one-sided markets during stress episodes (Schrimpf et al, 2020). Hence, the safe asset typically continues to be “safe” in terms of credit risk but faces mounting concerns about the ease of buying and selling it in a stressed market environment. Against this backdrop, enhancing the resiliency of government debt markets has been high on the policy agenda in national and international