IMF-金融市场代币化的最优策略（英）

IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. 2025 SEP Optimal Policy for Financial Market Tokenization Itai Agur and Alexander Copestake WP/25/185 * We are grateful to Charles Kahn (discussant), Thorsten Koeppl (discussant), Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Michael Junho Lee, FilippoMezzanotti, and audiences at the 2025 CEBRA Annual Meeting, IFABS 2025, the 2025 International Conference on Paymentsand Securities Settlement, 2025 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance, the 2025 IMF Annual Macro-Financial Research Conference and an internal IMF seminar for helpful comments. © 2025 International Monetary Fund WP/25/185IMF Working Paper Research Department Optimal Policy for Financial Market Tokenization Prepared by Itai Agur and Alexander Copestake * Authorized for distribution by Maria Soledad Martinez Peria September 2025 IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT: Competing broker initiatives to “tokenize” financial assets—i.e., represent them on programmable platforms—promise efficiency gains but raise concerns about market fragmentation. Policymakers in several countries are considering supporting such platforms or mandating their interoperability. We provide the first formal framework for analyzing optimal policy in this context. Brokers with heterogeneous market power compete to attract investors and execute their trades intra-broker or on a legacy platform. Coalitions of brokers can invest in creating a tokenized market with faster, cheaper inter-broker settlement. Partial coalitions divert trades away from excluded competitors, leading to equilibrium coalition structures that can feature excessive investment or insufficient tokenization. Neither public-private cost-sharing nor interoperability mandates are sufficient to achieve the social optimum when used alone, but their combination is. These results withstand incorporating an open-access ledger (e.g., a public blockchain). JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D85, G24, O33. Keywords: Tokenization; Interoperability; Intermediation; Trading platforms; Coali-tion formation. Author’s E-Mail Address: iagur@imf.org, acopestake@imf.org WORKING PAPERS Optimal Policy for Financial Market Tokenization Prepared by Itai Agur and Alexander Copestake 1IntroductionThe financial press is abuzz with talk of tokenizing financial assets, which is the creationof assets or representations of assets on a shared and programmable ledger (Agur et al.,2025b; Aldasoro et al., 2023).Programmability means that self-ex