美联储-金融稳定理论遭遇现实（英）

Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesFederal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online)The Theory of Financial Stability Meets RealityNina Boyarchenko, Kinda Hachem, Anya Kleymenova2025-054Please cite this paper as:Boyarchenko,Nina,KindaHachem,andAnyaKleymenova(2025).“TheThe-ory of Financial Stability Meets Reality,”Finance and Economics Discussion Se-ries 2025-054.Washington:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2025.054.NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.The Theory of Financial Stability Meets Reality⋆Nina Boyarchenko∗Kinda Hachem†Anya Kleymenova‡June 9, 2025AbstractA large literature at the intersection of economics and finance offers prescriptions for reg-ulating banks to increase financial stability. This literature abstracts from the discretionthat accounting standards give banks over financial reporting, creating a gap between theinformation assumed to be available to regulators in models of optimal regulation and the in-formation available to regulators in reality. We bridge insights from the economics, finance,and accounting literatures to synthesize knowledge about the design and implementationof bank regulation and identify areas where more work is needed.We present a simpleframework for organizing the relevant ideas, namely the externalities that motivate bankregulation, the rationales for allowing accounting discretion, and the use of discretion tocircumvent regulation. Our takeaway from reviewing work in these areas is that academicstudies of bank regulation and accounting discretion require a more unified approach to de-sign optimal policy for the real world.JEL Classifications: D62, E44, G21, G28, M41⋆We thank David Romer and four anonymous referees for many insightful comments. We also thankWilliam Bassett, Christopher Finger, Jo˜ao Santos, Cindy Vojtech, and especially Jim Naughton for helpfulconversations. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect theviews of the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or Federal Reserve System.∗ Federal Reserve Bank of New York, CEPR, CesIfo† Federal Reserve Bank of New York and University of Virginia, Darden School of Business‡ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System11. IntroductionBanking is a heavily regulated industry, yet it remains prone to large and costly disrup-tions. Over the past forty years, the U.S. has experienced two systemic banking crises: thesavings and loan (S