国际清算银行-重新思考银行的流动性要求（英）

PUBLICATION 16.3CM | [Document subtitle]FSI Briefs No 25 Rethinking banks’ liquidity requirements Rodrigo Coelho and Fernando Restoy May 2025 FSI Briefs are written by staff members of the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), sometimes in cooperation with other experts. They are short notes on regulatory and supervisory subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS or the Basel-based standard-setting bodies. This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). To contact the BIS Media and Public Relations team, please email media@bis.org. You can sign up for email alerts at www.bis.org/emailalerts.htm. © Bank for International Settlements 2025. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISSN 2708-1117 (online) ISBN 978-92-9259-856-3 (online) Rethinking banks’ liquidity requirements 1 Rethinking banks’ liquidity requirements1 Highlights • The 2023 banking turmoil underscored the complementarity of self-insurance-oriented minimum liquidity requirements and central bank liquidity support in safeguarding financial stability. • Despite their complementary nature, these two core components of the policy framework are often treated separately. • This paper proposes a framework bridging both components, with the objective of providing a flexible approach to address extreme liquidity stress. 1. Introduction The banking turmoil of 2023 sparked an important public debate on how to improve the regulatory framework for banks’ management of liquidity risk. The episode highlighted how the digitalisation of finance and the influence of social media have fundamentally amplified the severity and potentially the frequency of bank runs. At least two key avenues have been explored in this debate: (i) the potential refinement and strengthening of liquidity requirements, particularly the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR); and (ii) ensuring operational readiness for accessing central banks' liquidity support during periods of stress. To date, these two approaches have largely been pursued independently, with little consideration of their possible interactions. This is presumably because the current design of the LCR is driven by the notion of self-insurance. In particular, the LCR is built on the premise that banks should be able to withstand an adverse liquidity scenario with reserves or by monetising liquid assets in private markets. Moreover, while the LCR is calibrated to a stress scenario, it is not designed to shield banks from every conceivable liquidity shock. However, in extreme scenarios banks may need to resort to central bank facilities. While this approach could, depending on the central bank’s operational framework, carry a stigma effect, it may still be preferable in certain cases to large-scale sales of