世界银行-需要乡村选举：地方政府的更替和表现（英）

Policy Research Working Paper10920It Takes a Village ElectionTurnover and Performance in Local Bureaucracies Samuel Bazzi Masyhur Hilmy Benjamin Marx Mahvish Shaukat Andreas Stegmann Development Economics Development Research GroupSeptember 2024 Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedProduced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper 10920In many countries, local governments struggle with inef-ficiency and corruption, often perpetuated by entrenched elites. This paper explores how leadership changes affect bureaucratic performance at the local level by combining detailed personnel surveys with a regression discontinuity design in a large sample of Indonesian villages. The find-ings show that turnovers in village elections revitalize local bureaucracies, disrupt nepotistic networks, and improve local government performance. Bureaucrats under new leadership become more engaged, receive higher pay, and are less likely to be tied to past or present village officials, resulting in a more responsive bureaucracy that interacts more frequently with citizens and better understands their needs. This leads to higher levels of public service provision, measured in both administrative data and surveys con-ducted with citizens. Together, these findings suggest that leadership changes can mitigate elite capture and improve governance at the grassroots level.This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at sbazzi@ucsd.edu, m.hilmy@unsw.edu.au, bmarx@bu.edu, mshaukat@worldbank.org, and andreas.stegmann@warwick.ac.uk.It Takes a Village Election:Turnover and Performance in Local Bureaucracies*Samuel Bazzi†UC San DiegoMasyhur Hilmy‡University of New South WalesBenjamin Marx§Boston UniversityMahvish Shaukat¶World BankAndreas Stegmann||University of WarwickJEL Classifications: D70, H41, H71Keywords: Bureaucracy, Local Governments, Elections, Public Goods*We thank the Indonesia Research